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Introduction
The idea of disruptive technologies (Christensen, 1997) has been of-
ten highlighted in the management and innovation literature in recent 
years. Much of this theorizing focuses on the “incumbents’ curse” 
(Chandy & Tellis, 2000; Foster, 1986) and the difficulties for establis-
hed firms to align to new technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982). Some 
have directed attention to how firms can manage radical, discontinuous 
and disruptive innovations in relation to existing internal knowledge 
structures and processes (Dewar & Dutton, 1986; Ettlie, Bridges, & 
O’keefe, 1984; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002). Others (e.g. Rogers, 
1962; Utterback, 1994) have looked at how novel innovations form dis-
tinct diffusion patterns, where critical masses over time have the ability 
to weed out old regimes through positive feedback loops. Both these 
directions take the quasi-deterministic stance where the technology is 
seen to have an innate capacity to transform society and the focus of 
these authors is simply to record the processes. From this viewpoint, 
disruptive power is exerted through the technology’s inertial force and 
the medium’s way of transmitting its execution in an effective manner.
This article will highlight an alternative framework to explain dis-
ruptive outcomes, arguing in line with actor network theory (Callon, 
1986, 2007; Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 1986) that the disruptive 
power of a technology is not found merely in its inner core, but rather 
in how it performatively associates with the cultural and social norms 
of the wider society. In this sense we need to focus on the numerous 
and complex ways that certain notions of technology “are (or fail to 
be) articulated and mobilized in diverse - academic, consumer, media 
as well as practitioner – discourses” (Knights, Noble, Vurdubakis, & 
Willmott, 2002, p. 113). A technology is not in this framework dis-
ruptive or sustaining in itself but just often labelled so (Knights & 
Vurdubakis, 2005) whereas it is more often a productive outcome of a 
network of enrolled linkages with other social and material elements 
(Callon, 2007). This actor network theory (ANT) approach is still 
comparatively rare in the theoretical analyses of disruptive innovation 
since generally precedence is given either to the material aspects (i.e. 
technology) or to the social aspects to explain disruptive outcomes 
(Orlikowski, 2007). Put differently, the most common approaches to 
innovation take either a technological determinist view where new 
technologies are seen to disrupt organizational and social routines or 
a social shaping approach in which it is the cultural and social inter-
pretations of a technology that are seen as instrumental in creating 
change (MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1999). ANT breaks down this tech-
nical – cultural binary to facilitate a socio-material understanding of 
the enrolment of material artefacts and actors in the mobilisation of 
alliances that stimulate and sustain change and innovation.
To illustrate the socio-material link in disruptive innovations, two di-
gital music services will be analyzed – The Pirate Bay and Spotify – in 
relation to each other and also in how they are positioned toward the 
transformation of the music industry as a whole. Both ventures could 
be seen as successfully implemented innovations, with the same Swe-
dish geographical roots and performing similar tasks of distributing 
music to end-users through the application of new digital technology. 
But as they have gained acceptance among music consumers, the two 
initiatives have had a very different reception in relation to the domi-
nant incumbents of the music industry. This facilitates a comparative 
analysis and a nuanced theoretical reflection on the performance of 
digital technologies in the music industry, and how ‘disruptive’ in-
novations rely on elements beyond their technological core (Knights 
and Vurdubakis, 2005). Indeed, the way digital media is designed but 
also organized and associated with various other elements poses ra-
dically different challenges and implications for the protection and 
creative development of the music industry.
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According to the International Federation of the Phonographic In-
dustry (IFPI), global recorded music revenues fell from US$ 25.1 bi-
llion in 2002 to US$ 15.0 billion in 2013 (IFPI, 2014). The industry is 
often portrayed to be in crisis and the main evil is piracy, facilitated 
through the ‘digital revolution’ of peer-to-peer file sharing. Digitali-
zation is repeatedly said to strike hard on creative industries, such as 
music, film, books, and games, as the non-rivalry of digital goods are 
able to travel without necessarily taking copyright issues into conside-
ration (Benkler, 2006; Lessig, 2004). ‘Digitalization’ is thus frequently 
equated with ‘radical’ and ‘disruptive’ movements on the market 
(Bower & Christensen, 1995). Interestingly, though, despite the de-
cline in overall music revenues, sales through digital services have in-
creased to a US$5.9 billion business in 2013, making up for more than a 
quarter of the recording companies’ current revenues (IFPI, 2014). Far 
too often, digital media is talked about in overly simplistic terms and 
lumped together as one technology with generalizable consequences, 
despite the obvious differences among the plenitude of digital media 
services emerging (Baym, 2010). Most of them can be seen as new and 
creative, but are they also inevitably disruptive to the incumbents’ mar-
ket positions in the sense that they challenge the oligopolistic corporate 
structure of the music industry? We seek to contribute to the debate by 
providing one possible answer to this question. 
Method
The article is mainly conceptual, drawing on actor network theory as 
a lens through which to examine the organization and disorganiza-
tion of radical innovation (e.g. digital technologies and peer-2-peer) 
in the music industry. A comparative case study is utilized to illustra-
te similarities and differences between radical innovations and their 
association and/or dissociation with industry incumbents and end-
users. Case study research is a well-established method to generate 
new and empirically valid insights (Abbott, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Stake, 2000). Keeping 
in mind that case studies do not allow for statistical generalisation, 
they can still provide analytical generalisation in the transformation 
of empirical data to theory, rather than to a population (Yin, 1994). 
Cases can provide good illustrations of dynamic processes played out 
over time (Siggelkow, 2007) and can generate insights about a parti-
cular issue or topic (Stake, 2000), such as the disruptive elements of 
music innovators. 
The two cases in this article – Spotify and The Pirate Bay – as well as 
the industry as a whole, are all appropriate for the purpose of analy-
sing radical and disruptive innovation. This is due to current trans-
formations that are partly driven by technological advancements but 
also because of the rather intense rhetorical ‘war’ between the media 
corporations and the ‘pirates’. The Spotify case represents the ‘legal’ 
actor, and the Pirate Bay case represents the ‘illegal’ actor. Over the 
years, both services have gained strong positions on the global music 
market and have taken active roles in transforming music consump-
tion at large. The information about the two cases is based on official 
documentation in books, blogs, news articles, TV interviews, their 
websites, court material and through other similar references.
 The article is structured as follows; in the first section we examine 
the literature on radical and disruptive technologies where the 
predominant model is that of diffusion, which we challenge. The 
second section explores a theoretical framework that focuses on the 
sociology of translation as developed by actor network theory. We 
then turn to our comparative analysis of the two innovations in the 
use of digital technology in the music industry – the Pirate Bay and 
Spotify.
Discontinuous, radical and disruptive technologies
Technology is often argued to act as a central force in shaping condi-
tions for organizations and societies (e.g. Dosi, 1982; Solow, 1957; Tee-
ce, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Much in line with Kuhn’s (1965) 
theories of science, Dosi (1982) introduced the ideas of technology pa-
radigms and technology trajectories to explain continuous and discon-
tinuous change. He suggests that technology evolves through certain 
trajectories based on taken-for-granted paradigmatic assumptions on 
possibilities and limitations, which occasionally are being disrupted 
to form new trajectories (ibid.). Of course, technologies such as the 
instant communications provided by mobile phones can be simulta-
neously positive in facilitating innovations in production while dis-
rupting its uninterrupted continuity (Rennecker & Godwin, 2005). As 
technology advancement is path dependent (Coombs & Hull, 1998), 
firms develop installed bases (Farrell & Saloner, 1985) and dominant 
designs (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) with high switching costs in 
both core capabilities and materialized structures. Schumpeter’s 
(1934) notion of creative destruction points to the proposition that 
the obsolete must be torn down in order for something new to emer-
ge. Technological innovations, thus, always have a relation to the past 
if only to be a contrast with that which they supersede. 
The type, level and effect of a technology’s creative destruction have 
been portrayed in various ways. Tushman and Anderson (1986) su-
ggest that technology change happens through a cumulative, incre-
mental process until it is punctuated by a major advance, what they 
call a discontinuous innovation. Such major breakthroughs strongly 
improve the performance or price level in relation to existing techno-
logies and their advancements are so significant that older technolo-
gies cannot compete through greater efficiency, design or economies 
of scale. Another, highly interrelated, way of distinguishing the degree 
of innovativeness in relation to incremental change is through so ca-
lled radical innovation. Ettlie, et al. (1984) argue that innovations are 
radical when they are new to the firm and to the industry, and/or 
require substantial and costly changes in the firm’s processes as well 
as output. Radical innovations have also been coined as breakthrough 
inventions (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001) or pioneering innovations (Ali, 
1994) or highly innovative products (Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991) 
which are all based on substantial technolgoical advances that offer 
new technological trajectories and paradigms (Dosi, 1982). Chandy 
and Tellis (1998) classify innovations along two dimensions; newness 
of technology and degree of customer need fulfilment per dollar, ar-
guing that incremental innovations are low on both dimensions, whi-
le radical innovations are high on both. All these ways of defining the 
extent to which innovations are radical relate to how they divert from 
established knowledge and practices. 
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Abernathy and Clark (1985) argue that major technological shifts can 
have both creative and destructive effects on the existing industry. 
Innovations can disrupt the market by introducing new knowled-
ge competences and/or relationships but they can also consolidate 
existing knowledge competences, linkages and market positions. 
This view is also repeated by Tushman and Anderson (1986) who 
characterize technological discontinuities as competence-enhancing 
or competence-destroying, suggesting that the former builds on em-
bodied know-how in the replaced technology while the latter render 
the knowledge in existing technologies obsolete. Christensen (1997, 
p. xv) popularized the term disruptive technologies, arguing that they 
“bring to a market a very different value proposition than had been 
available previously”. Disruptive technologies are often characterized 
as initially underperforming dominant alternatives in the markets 
along the dimensions that the mainstream customers currently value. 
However, over time they will displace the dominant technologies be-
cause they offer alternative other features, which customers earlier did 
not want or were unaware of, but eventually will learn to appreciate. 
Disruptive technologies are also associated with the displacement of 
market power, where new entrants tend to weed out previously suc-
cessful incumbents (Chandy & Tellis, 2000). This could be seen as a 
specific type of technological change, operating through specific me-
chanisms and having particular consequences (Danneels, 2004). Dis-
ruptive technologies can therefore be understood as acting on diffe-
rent dimensions than radical innovations such that, for instance, “the 
radicalness is a technology-based dimension of innovations, and the 
disruptiveness is a market-based dimension” (Govindarajan & Kopa-
lle, 2006, p. 14). In a sense, this moves the continuum further over so 
that the opposite of disruptive innovation becomes not incremental 
but sustaining innovation. As Sandström (2011) has shown, these dis-
placements can take place in both low-end and high-end segments.
Danneels (2004) has raised some further critiques of the notion of 
disruptive technologies. One such is the problem of defining what a 
disruptive technology really is (e.g. What are the essential characte-
ristics of a disruptive technology?). For instance, Christensen’s early 
work (Christensen, 1997) focuses on the technology aspect of inno-
vation, while his later work (Christensen & Raynor, 2003) brings in a 
larger variety of innovation types as potentially disruptive for the in-
cumbent firms. Markides (2006) argues for the importance of separa-
te disruptive business model innovations as opposed to technological 
innovations since they “pose radically different challenges for esta-
blished firms and have radically different implications for managers” 
Markides (2006, p. 19). Danneels (2004) also points to the challenge 
of knowing at what exact time a technology becomes disruptive, and 
for the possibility of applying the theory to ex ante predictions. He 
urges further research to develop analytical tools for identifying (po-
tentially) disruptive technologies – a call which has been accepted by, 
for instance, Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006). 
Actor Network Theory as a framework to analyse disruption
In challenging the mainstream assumptions about disruptive techno-
logies, this article raises questions whether it is possible to find the 
power of disruptiveness in the technology or the innovation itself. As 
Latour (Latour, 1986, p. 264) argues, “power is not something one can 
possess – indeed it must be treated as a consequence rather than as a 
cause of action”. By this he separates out power in potentia, that is, so-
mething you perceive to ‘have’, and power in actu, i.e. actual power to 
enforce. The latter is always dependent on the actions of others rather 
than some intrinsic characteristics of the sender. Latour’s argument 
is a continuation of Foucault’s (1980, 1982) ideas that power is not 
possessed, but exercised, and that action is always action on the ac-
tions of others. Translating this discussion to the field of innovation, 
technologies can only be considered as disruptive if the surrounding 
elements act accordingly. True, to a large extent innovators try to 
inscribe the behaviours of the users (Akrich, 1992), but the intended 
scripts do often meet with anti-programs and descriptions that are 
unintended (Latour, 1987). 
Callon (1991, 1992) explains the link between the ‘social’, ‘technical’ 
and ‘economic’ by introducing the concept of techno-economic net-
work as “a coordinated set of heterogeneous actors which interact 
more or less successfully to develop, produce, distribute and diffuse 
methods for generating goods and services” (Callon, 1991, p. 133). 
For him, the dynamic relationships amongst these actors are being 
held together through the circulation of intermediaries such as mo-
ney, artefacts, texts and human beings, and the durability and robust-
ness of these associations determine the success or failure of the inno-
vation. Latour (1986) argues in similar ways, that the power of a token 
(e.g. an innovation) lies in its ability to hold together associations with 
other material and non-material elements in durable forms. “It’s not 
technology that is ‘socially shaped’, but rather techniques that grant 
extension and durability to social ties” (Latour, 2005, p. 238). Depen-
ding on which elements it succeeds in attracting and stabilizing, the 
innovation transforms activities and relations in different ways (Ca-
llon, 1986). In other words, an actor is a network of relations and it is 
from these relations that the innovation is perceived. In the making 
of such process, it is therefore not known whether the outcome will 
be sustaining or disruptive, and which actors or actants it will trans-
form (Latour, 1996). For ANT, then knowledge and innovation is best 
understood as a hybrid of objects, social artefacts and discourses that 
are organized through material and non-material agents mobilised 
for purposes of securing the actor network, despite continual disrup-
tions and processes of reassembly (Latour, 2005). Callon (1986) in-
troduced four moments of translation; 1) problematization in which 
the actor is defining the nature and problems of stakeholder groups 
and making itself an ‘obligatory passage point’ for providing a good 
solution; 2) interessement, where the network locks the others into 
different proposed roles by building physical and mental infrastruc-
tures which tie the stakeholder groups to the network; 3) enrolment 
refers to the negotiations, seductions, argumentations and sometimes 
force to coordinate the emerging network; and 4) mobilization des-
cribes relations that have been strengthened in so far as the allies are 
(at least temporarily) obedient and opponents silenced, providing the 
initial actor with power in actu. 
To illustrate this alternative framework inspired by the sociology of 
translation and actor network theory, a comparative case study of two 
digital music services will now be introduced and analysed in relation 
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to the copyright owners and the music consumers. It demonstrates 
how the often labelled ‘disruptive’, radical and discontinuous digital 
technologies related to music production and distribution have had 
a creative impact on the music industry and its various stakeholders 
over the years. 
Case comparison
Many new digital services have emerged in the last ten years to take 
advantage of the ‘radical’ information technologies in the music in-
dustry. MP3.com, Napster, KaZaa, Limewire, BearShare, iTunes, 
Amazon MP3, Myspace, YouTube, Zune, the PirateBay, LastFM, Spo-
tify, MOG, WiMP, Beats Music, Vevo, Pandora, Deezer and Google 
Play are only a few of the many actors which have gained much public 
recognition through information-pull rather than information-push 
technologies (Duchêne & Waelbroeck, 2006). Some of these ventures 
act in a grey zone of intellectual property rights (or even clearly ove-
rriding them), which have made them official enemies of the big re-
cording companies. The user-friendly, cheap and not easily controlled 
distribution process brings a perceived threat to actors traditionally 
earning their profits from exploiting copyright material, in the fear 
that pirate copies will substitute the purchase of the original and thus 
reduce company profit. But, as (Baym, 2010, p. 17) argues, “even as 
we are concerned with their impact, we must avoid the temptation to 
look at new media only as a whole. Each of these media, as well as the 
mobile phone, offers unique affordances, or packages of potentials and 
constraints, for communication”. Pirate Bay and Spotify are two diffe-
rent kinds of these digital music services that illustrate similarities but 
also differences in how digital music services develop their strategic 
attempts to make a mark in the industry. 
The case of the Pirate Bay
The Pirate Bay (TPB) has been known as an open website for indexing 
so called torrents, i.e. small protocols including metadata for direc-
ting the file sharers to digital content. As such it has functioned as a 
virtual meeting place for exchange of, among others, music files (MP3 
and music videos), and has gained much attention among file-sharers 
as well as in the news media. TPB has over the years often been ar-
gued to be the biggest search tool for torrents, with tens of millions of 
active users and access to more than four billion torrent files.
The site was first launched in 2003 on a server in Mexico, where the 
Swedish hacker and one of the alleged founders, Gottfrid Svartholm 
Warg, was then working. The venture had emerged from loose con-
versations on an IRC channel between him and Fredrik Neij, with the 
initial idea to build a tracker for local, Swedish material. As the usage 
expanded also internationally, more hosting capacity was needed and 
TPB was moved to bigger servers in Sweden in 2004. Peter Sunde, a 
friend of Neij, also become involved early on in the project. As the most 
politically active of the three, he became a public spokesperson for the 
platform (a post he formally left in August 2009). The people behind 
TPB have from the start been actively involved in the public debate on 
file-sharing, arguing for the users’ right to copy and spread digitalized 
culture. The logotype of TPB is a pirate ship with set sails. It carries a 
modification of the Jolly Roger flag, in which the skull is replaced by a 
cassette band, as an ironic critique to an anti-copyright infringement 
campaign from the 80s, “Home Taping Is Killing Music”. On the websi-
te, TPB openly published letters from various actors threatening to take 
legal action against them. They also publish their own replies, which are 
written with a mixture of scorn, mockery and humour. 
TPB was designed to provide a searchable index of torrents. It was 
built on a software called open tracker, which is one of several free 
trackers on the market and they are all designed to be fast and to 
use minimal system resources. A torrent is a small data file with an 
address to a specific content and a link to all the other users of the 
same torrent. These torrents can be downloaded from search engi-
nes such as TPB, but to activate the link in order to start the actual 
uploading and downloading, the user needs to have a certain client 
software (there are many free so called BitTorrent clients on the mar-
ket). Through this program, the torrent locates other active torrents, 
to start the file-sharing. A group of users which have activated the 
same torrent is known as a “swarm”. As one user begins to download 
the file, other active users in the swarm can start downloading the 
finished content from him or her. This makes it a fast and resilient 
process even for large data files, since it distributes the load to many 
users. In fact, contrary to when a file is accessible from only one loca-
tion, this peer-to-peer technology makes the process faster the more 
users are taking part.
TPB was not designed to allow much social interaction between users, 
above the actual peer-to-peer sharing of digital content. Possibilities 
were created for the uploader of the torrent to add information about 
its content (type, number of files, size, tags, quality, name of songs, 
artists etc.) to other users, and for other users to give comments on 
the content and do ratings on its quality. However, very few social 
cues about the anonymous users were embedded in the system. Mem-
bers could create individual profiles based on their user names, but 
this profile only discloses the level of activity in terms of the number 
of uploads. While limited in the variety of social cues, the profiles 
provide the opportunity for active users to build a reputation in rela-
tion to quantity, quality and newness of their uploaded material. The 
imputed tag information in the torrents together with the aggregated 
ratings and possible content comments, may also affect the propensi-
ty for new users to download a particular file. 
In terms of storage, early on TPB decentralized the location of the ac-
tual digitalized content to the participating users’ own hard drives. This 
gives at least three advantages; it reduces the risk of legal threats toward 
the service (although TPB did face a trial and prosecution in 2009), it 
makes the peer-to-peer technique more effective, and it provide users 
total offline access to the material. The fact that the content is downloa-
ded as digital files of standardized formats, it spurs the mobility of the 
content. Users can easily replicate or convert the files and spread them 
further - to other users as well as to other types of devices. TPB has been 
positioned as “the world’s most resilient BitTorrent site” and as such it 
has a considerable reach, but it does not in any way prohibit or compete 
with other similar web services. Rather the opposite.
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On 31 May 2006, the police made a big raid against TPB, confisca-
ting all its servers. A preliminary investigation was conducted which 
on January 21 2008 led to Swedish prosecutors filing charges aga-
inst Neij, Svartholm and Sunde together with the businessman Carl 
Lundström who owned the company Rix Telecom where TPB servers 
were hosted in Sweden. All of them were charged with “promoting 
other people’s infringements of copyright laws”. In April 2009, they 
were found guilty to accessory to crime against copyright law by the 
district court and sentenced to one year in jail each, as well as fines 
of approximately $3,5 million (30 million SEK) paid to a number of 
music-, movie- and game corporations. The lawyers of all four defen-
dants appealed the verdict. On 26 November 2010, a Swedish appeals 
court returned the verdict, decreasing the original prison terms (Neij 
to 10 months, Sunde to 8 months and Lundström to 4 months) but 
increasing the fine to 46 million SEK. 
The legal process did, however, not totally shut down the website, des-
pite the fact that those initially involved at least officially left the pro-
ject. Several further setbacks have however occurred since. Following 
a complaint from the British Phonographic Industry (BPI), on 30th 
of April 2012 the High Court in London issued a ruling that six ma-
jor internet service providers in the UK should block their customers 
from using TPB site. Similar rulings have since then been taken in 
numerous other countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and 
Italy. Also web services such as Facebook and Microsoft Live Messen-
ger have censored links to the Pirate Bay site. In August 2013, TPB 
announced the release of a free web browser which enables users to 
sidestep this type of “censorship”, and there are also numerous other 
simple ways to circumvent the block that are readily communicated 
through social networks. In December 2014, the Swedish police rai-
ded a web server location in Stockholm which made the TPB site go 
down. In a few days, several new alternative sites emerged, mirroring 
the old version of TPB. These forms of hostile actions from the legal 
system pose a great threat to websites such as TPB, and these actions 
mainly lead the “pirates” to start looking for other, more effective al-
ternatives. So despite a loss in the court leading to the closure of the 
TPB service, there have emerged new innovations and organizing 
mechanisms, or the enrolment of other actors that have developed 
less traceable interactions or other ways of commercializing the ser-
vice. A few months later, the Pirate Bay opened again.
The case of Spotify
Spotify is a music streaming service founded in 2006 by the Swedish 
entrepreneurs’ Daniel Ek and Martin Lorentzon. As summarized on 
Spotify’s homepage in 2010; 
Spotify is a new way to listen to music: Any track you like, any time 
you like. Just search for it in Spotify, then play it. Any artist, any 
album, any genre - all available instantly. With Spotify, there are no 
limits to the amount of music you can listen to. Just help yourself 
to whatever you want, whenever you want it. (2010-10-07)
The service was initially run as a beta version in a smaller invitation-
based community until it was officially launched in October 2008. 
By signing licensing agreements with all the major record label 
companies, as well as a multitude of independent labels, Spotify po-
sitioned itself as a music provider, in contrast to “piracy” alternatives. 
From the start the service was available in Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, France, the UK and Spain, but it rather quickly spread 
to other countries. Starting as a small venture, it has been established 
as a company with 200 employees and headquarters in the UK. In 
September 2010 Spotify had a big party in London, celebrating their 
outreach to10 million users across Europe. At that time, it offered ac-
cess to a catalogue of more than 10 million tracks. In July 2011, Spo-
tify launched its US service after years of negotiation with the major 
record companies. In December 2012 the service reached 20 million 
users with 5 million subscribers, and in January 2015 it had reached 
60 million users with 15 million subscribers.
The service is based on a free but proprietary client program which 
the user needs to download and install, and is therefore not a pure 
web-based service. From the application, the user can search and play 
music and also put together own playlists for easy access. Spotify was 
initially built on a combination of server-based streaming and peer-
to-peer technology where users transferred music in peer-to-peer fas-
hion similar to the torrent technology. This technique allowed Spotify 
to reduce the huge costs for server resources as a startup, but as of the 
fall 2014, Spotify only stream from own servers. The fact that Spo-
tify uses streaming technology where the music is not downloaded 
as a whole, makes it more complicated (although not impossible) to 
replicate and redistribute it to peers. Simultaneously, it gives a high 
flexibility and mobility for the user since the access to one’s favourite 
playlists can be reached from multiple locations and hardware. For 
instance, the company launched applications for iPhone and Android 
mobile systems in 2009 and for Windows Mobile in late 2010, offering 
users access to their playlists through their mobile phones. 
In 2010, Spotify opened up new social dimensions to their music 
service, as they introduced a function where users can create a pro-
file and publish their playlists of artists and tracks for public view. 
The profiles in themselves are not including much information and 
functionality, but by linking them to social websites, such as Face-
book, Twitter and Messenger, opened a possibility of sharing music 
tracks and playlists with peers. Initially, Spotify did not have features 
for users to communicate directly with each other via the client pro-
gram, but in April 2013 they released such function. Still, however, 
Spotify does not allow its users to be directly involved in the develop-
ment of functionality or content.
Unlike TPB, the users or artists themselves are not allowed to upload 
any content to the catalogues. This can only be done through the 
contracts signed with the record label companies or other establis-
hed artist aggregators. Hence, Spotify retains a tight control over the 
music content, ensuring that property rights are not being violated. 
In that sense, Spotify has similarities to iTunes who use Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) to enforce users to respect copyright laws. But 
Spotify´s streaming technology gives the user instant access to a 
large music content without needing to download and pay for each 
song. Spotify have a so called “freemium” business model, where a 
base functionality is free for the user (although with advertisements 
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interrupting between tracks), while premium functionality is offered 
to paid subscribers (approximately 10 euro per month) in terms of 
commercial-free, higher bit rate streams, access through mobile pho-
ne, and offline access to music. According to the license agreements, 
a proportion of the income streams are handed over to the copyright 
owners. The major record companies also received shares in Spotify 
when contracts were signed. The founders, Ek and Lorentzon, have 
been vocal in the debate about the digital revolution and its effect on 
the music industry, highlighting that Spotify is a legal alternative to 
the pirates. In several newspaper interviews, Ek has said that “Our 
point of departure is to generate a legal service which can compe-
te directly with the pirate services”. Indeed they seek to brand their 
offering precisely in opposition to illegal pirates in their internal pro-
motions on the site, to the extent that on the free service, declarations 
of their being an alternative to pirate sites are as frequent as the com-
mercial adverts. This approach probably helped Spotify to pronounce 
itself as a Technology Pioneer in the World Economic Forum 2010 
and the entrepreneurs behind the web service have several times been 
collecting entrepreneurship prizes and awards. For instance, Daniel 
Ek was named by Wired Magazine as the greatest digital influence 
in Europe in 2014. As of 2012, the CEO and founder Daniel Ek was 
ranked 395th on the British rich list with a calculated worth of £190 
million.
However, voices have also been raised concerning the inadequacy of 
the licensing deals with the artists, arguing for a more transparent in-
come process. For instance, in 2009, it was claimed that the superstar 
Lady Gaga received just $167 from Spotify for her hit “Poker Face” 
during a five month period when the song was streamed over a mi-
llion times. The company then insisted that the money would increase 
vastly as more subscribers enter and advertising revenues escalate. In 
2014, the American country singer Taylor Swift also voiced her cri-
tique against Spotify and pulled out her whole catalogue of songs in 
protest of the size of royalties. Spotify answered in a blog post;
Quincy Jones posted on Facebook that “Spotify is not the enemy; 
piracy is the enemy”. You know why? Two numbers: Zero and 
Two Billion. Piracy doesn’t pay artists a penny – nothing, zilch, 
zero. Spotify has paid more than  two billion dollars  to labels, 
publishers and collecting societies for distribution to songwriters 
and recording artists. A billion dollars from the time we started 
Spotify in 2008 to last year and another billion dollars since then. 
(2014-11-11)
The ‘disruptiveness’ of TPB and Spotify and an actor net-
work analysis
TPB and Spotify are to be considered as ‘radical’ music services in 
terms of how they have opened up new ways of providing music to the 
public, and in doing so have challenged the existing business struc-
ture in the industry. Both ventures have utilized new digital techno-
logies as a vehicle for music distribution, but TPB and Spotify have 
different programs-of-actions inscribed in their ‘radical’ technologies, 
in line with the purpose of enrolling their different defined stakehol-
der groups. The technological designs are, thus, closely linked to how 
each initiative differentiates itself toward the incumbent firms, and 
how they are constructed to facilitate content and usage of content. 
This is what Callon (1986) calls interessement, i.e. the process of at-
tracting selected parts of the environment to be mobilized into the 
venture.
For TPB, the end-users are considered the most relevant social group, 
and the interessement process is aimed at providing them a platform 
for sharing material in an easy, free, anonymous and effective way. For 
these users, the service provider has few restrictions as they do not 
censor any content or shut down any user accounts. TPB has instead 
chosen a highly distributed approach for uploading as well as down-
loading of content. The service is relying solely on user activities, and 
that is why it is important to involve the interest of the masses of ac-
tive end-users. Due to its’ nowadays millions of users’ uploads, the 
website’s search index includes a large variety of material – from the 
latest top hits to obscure bootlegs and private remixed versions. Of-
ten, a huge number of tracks are zipped into one big file, e.g. a collec-
tion of albums from one specific artist, a music era or a genre, which 
escalates the downloading process further. The sound quality can of 
course also differ, the tag information can be diverted and files may be 
destroyed or, in a worst-case scenario, infected with a virus. However, 
since the users’ ongoing file-sharing activities are disclosed together 
with members’ comments, preferences and discriminations can guide 
the seeker to ‘good’ content in a self-organizing way. 
Another potential stakeholder group for TPB is the intellectual pro-
perty owners of content. In this case, TPB representatives did not put 
down effort to align the web service in accordance to this group’s in-
terests. The website has no compensation structures in place to pay 
artists, producers, distributers or any other copyright holders. The 
anti-programs from some of these actors have also been very outs-
poken as the dominant music industry actors both sue TPB in court 
and use public media to discredit the website as ‘evil pirate’. From 
the rhetoric of the music industry and the media it is easy to get an 
impression that all of the material is illegal, but TPB hosts torrents 
directed toward both copyright- and non-copyright material and it 
can sometimes be difficult for the file-sharer to know which one is 
which. To answer the anti-programs of aggressive copyright owners, 
representatives of TPB earlier replied in a rather ironic and ridiculing 
language. This language war led to a positioning of the web servi-
ce as an illegal copyright intruder, but also as a rebellious place for 
the young generation of music lovers. In fact, it could be argued that 
the design of the web service is enhancing resilience not only to an 
effective spread of digital content per se, but also to the shielding of 
file-sharers with illegal intentions; it is distributed to a large popu-
lation which makes it difficult to trace and to sort out who is doing 
what, it is anonymous and accessible from any internet connection, 
and the interaction with the site is limited to the torrent downloading 
which is a very short time. The site’s name and logo – indicating a 
calm bay for pirates – also supports this rather deliberate positioning 
in favour of piracy on almost ideological terms. Hence, the dissocia-
tion from the big record labels made them simultaneously one of the 
most important actants for mobilizing the website. The distributed 
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users embraced to a large extent this ‘pirate’ position, and continued 
its ‘mission’ even after the initial founders were legally stopped by the 
court. Even for some property owners (predominantly smaller record 
labels and artists) TPB – with its radical image and effective distri-
bution channels – was appreciated as a means to fight the dominant 
incumbents of the industry.
While sharing the same problematization of how to access music fre-
ely or at economic prices, Spotify differs from TPB both in the range 
of content it offers but also in the process of interessement through 
which it mobilizes parts of the environment. Rather than demonize 
the suppliers of its products, it has mobilized them, the law and adver-
tisers as allies by which it can differentiate itself from those networks 
such as TPB that alienate suppliers by facilitating the breaching of 
copyright by users. Spotify has established a gatekeeping authority 
over the offered material, being an obligatory passage point (Ca-
llon, 1986) in deciding which tracks are allowed to be streamed by 
the users. This makes it possible to secure good sound quality and 
opens up possibilities to organize the content in a user-friendly way. 
Context information about the artist and the album can be imputed 
and changed whenever necessary and related music can be linked 
making it easy to find new favourites. In addition, because it is not 
illegal, Spotify is linked to other social media as means of enrolling 
and mobilizing additional users through its network of existing users. 
The established licensing agreements with record labels have formed 
a business model where copyright owners receive income from the 
activities on Spotify, and through the gatekeeping role it is possible to 
make sure that no illegal material is accessible. This also means that 
Spotify can remove access to a streamed track whenever they want, 
even if the users have bookmarked it in their playlists. The fact that 
Spotify has proprietary ownership of the technology allows them to 
support this strategy through Digital Rights Management (DRM) and 
to continuously upgrade and improve its functionality and copyright 
protection simultaneously. 
Spotify has, hence, several parallel relevant social groups that they 
need continuously to enrol; (e.g. users, advertisers and content ow-
ners). Instead of opposing or ignoring intellectual property issues, 
the web service has rather utilized the copyright and DRM to acce-
lerate their businesses although the business model operates on two 
distinct fronts – a free service with restrictions on users extending 
their network of use to non-internet connections or a subscription 
service that frees the user from these restrictions as well as from ad-
vertising interruptions. While funding the free service comes from 
advertising, this facilitates enrolment of users by giving them a basic 
service from which large numbers upgrade. The design of the music 
service facilitates, in terms of establishing control over content as 
well as technology, a positioning in direct opposition to the “evil” 
pirates. By contrast, Spotify can claim to act as the noble knight who 
will rescue the confused music industry facing disruptive or des-
tructive aspects of the digital revolution. While TPB can be seen as 
a service mainly delivering value to the file-sharers, Spotify is ba-
lancing the inclinations of various actors as well as mobilizing non-
human actors in the network; copyright owners are protected from 
illegal file-sharing and receive new income streams, and users get a 
well-functioned, user friendly and accessible music service with a 
large up-to-date music catalogue within the confines of intellectual 
property.
The comparison between TPB and Spotify suggests that digital music 
services should not be lumped together into a homogeneous group 
since they differ on several key technological, organizational and in-
tellectual property dimensions. These aspects are highly linked and 
congruent for TPB as well as for Spotify and their various combi-
nations position them rather differently in relation to the industry 
incumbents and to the overall industry development as such. Put 
differently, their mobilized associations and dissociations to other 
social and technological elements make up the unique identity and 
direction of each venture. 
From Christensen’s (1997) argumentation on sustaining and disrupti-
ve innovations, TPB as a macro actor (Callon & Latour, 1981) shows 
many disruptive aspects. Due to its mobilization of millions of users 
and the hosting of about 5 million torrent files, TPB can speak with a 
disdainful or irreverent voice against the established power structures 
of the music industry. In this way it questions the view of consumers 
as passive content recipients and the business logic of paying for the 
carrier (e.g. cassette, LP, CD, DVD) of music. Continuing the journey 
that predecessors such as Napster and Kazaa started, TPB could be 
seen as having a transforming potential on the music industry and 
its enrolment process poses a threat to the big recording firms’ oligo-
polistic structure in a vein not dissimilar to the independent labels’ 
attempts in the 1950s. This is in line with the Schumpeterian (1934) 
view of entrepreneurship – as a function of creative destruction to 
the market, enforcing imbalances and opening up new opportunities. 
Actor network theory, however, provides a more detailed perception 
on how the creative destruction emerges in practice, as a translation 
and mobilization process of technical as well as social elements.
Spotify, on the other hand, has aimed to mobilize both the users and 
the intellectual property owners (including large incumbent music 
corporations) in parallel. This means a balancing of different proble-
matization and interessement activities toward the two stakeholder 
groups. To users, the focus is put on quality, instant availability and 
user friendliness – above the fact that it is digital, free(mium) and le-
gal. To content providers, the focus is put on being a new distribution 
channel to a large customer base through a service safe from illegal 
use and with a business model in place to protect the income streams 
of intellectual property owners. In this way, Spotify rather acts as a 
saviour to the music industry, supporting the big corporations in the 
war against pirates. And as legal music services such as Spotify are 
being incorporated into the income streams of large incumbent firms, 
peer-to-peer and streaming technologies are largely being transfor-
med from a disruptive to a sustaining force.
Despite obvious differences in their associations with social and ma-
terial elements, TPB and Spotify can be considered as having a sym-
biotic rather than conflicting relation. Although the Spotify founders 
speak loudly about pirates as a threat to the music industry, the exis-
tence of piracy is in fact one of the strongest door-openers for legal 
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digital music services to be accepted by the dominant market actors. 
In effect, piracy provides Spotify with the conditions for generating 
their own legitimacy. Piracy is the unacceptable Other (Derrida, 
1982) through which Spotify can secure its existence. In similar ways, 
TPB partly legitimizes itself as a revolt against the big corporations’ 
power over the passive users. TPB and Spotify are in basic terms per-
forming a similar service – i.e. providing music to a large population 
of music lovers utilizing ‘radical’ digital technology – but they have 
mobilized themselves differently in terms of rhetoric and associations 
to social and material elements. One of the actors is positioned as the 
biggest enemy of the established music industry and the other as the 
Entrepreneur of the year.
Streaming- and peer-to-peer technologies are arguably as radical to 
the music industry as the phonograph, the radio and the cassette tape 
recorder was earlier in history. But as the comparison between TPB 
and Spotify shows, it is not only the ‘inner’ features of the techno-
logies that define their level of disruptiveness on the behaviours of 
users or the structure of the market. To an equal degree, it is the asso-
ciations each venture has developed and maintained with respect to 
other elements, such as to the acceptance or rejection of the rights of 
dominant proprietary owners and to the discourses of piracy as good 
or evil, which energize its impact as a sustaining or disruptive inno-
vation. The power of disruption is, hence, to be found in the music 
service’s associations in actu, and will therefore always be up for grabs 
(Latour, 1986). Associations holding together a disruptive innovation 
could be strengthened or diminished, depending on how the various 
actors interact and intersect, but it is not only in the core technology 
that one will find the answer for what impact a certain initiative will 
have on the market, what direction it will move in, where it will be 
displaced. It is much more in the actor networks that are rendered 
more or less robust through complex relations within and between 
technological artefacts and socio-political associations. 
Conclusion
Inspired by actor network theory, this article suggests an alternative 
framework for looking at disruptive innovations which challenge the 
mainstream approaches based on technology-centric and diffusion 
model-based assumptions. It agrees with previous critiques of the 
notion of disruption as non-precise and with limited predictive use 
(Dan & Chieh, 2010; Danneels, 2004; Markides, 2006; Tellis, 2006). 
What is or isn’t a disruptive innovation has not been the main ques-
tion for this article, but it is arguably important elsewhere to sort out 
the differences between disruption in terms of altered value proposi-
tions, consumption patterns and/or market structures. Regardless of 
the definition and in contrast to the above critiques of ideas around 
disruption, however, we argue that the solution to the ‘innovator’s di-
lemma’ (Christensen, 1997) is not to be found in a further examina-
tion of technological features and design, finer categories and classi-
fications, and internal organizational structures and attitudes. Rather, 
one needs to thoroughly examine and describe the innovation in rela-
tion to its processes of establishing obligatory passage points around 
certain problematization and interests that enrol material and human 
actors around networks mobilized to a point where alternatives seem 
implausible or are denied. Hence, the disruptive power of innovation 
depends on how it succeeds in associating itself with certain cultural, 
political and social norms.
Determining the disruptive innovations through studying what is 
already-made rather than its development in the making (Latour, 
1987) is rather unproblematic (although not necessarily useful), as 
all the associations then have been silenced and black-boxed (Callon 
& Latour, 1981). But we follow the proposition that innovations are 
travelling ideas (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996) in continual processes 
of becoming constituted through associations that they themselves 
constitute. Here there is no presumption of stability since actor net-
works can implode as readily as reproduce themselves (Latour, 1986), 
but it forces analysts as well as network members to move away from 
a preoccupation with technology per se, and instead to examine more 
carefully the technology’s linkages with social and organizational 
content in the contexts of innovation management.
For practitioners, to highlight not only the material but also the so-
cial, does perhaps not solve the ‘incumbent’s curse’ (Chandy & Tellis, 
2000), but it would potentially release the decision makers’ energy 
toward actively enrolling and mobilizing new associations rather than 
solely protecting the already stabilized ones. Furthermore, the focus 
on social, economic and technical interactions rather than mainly 
on technological features illuminates the highly difficult managerial 
challenge of predicting future disruptive threats, as these forms of ‘as-
sociation battles in the making’ often lead to unpredictable outcomes 
and unforeseen consequences (Callon & Law, 1982). It also facilitates 
the understanding that a technology’s potential for disruption resides 
as much with followers as with inscribers (Latour, 1987) – including 
the industry actors (i.e. producers), but more so the users (including 
‘pirating’ music lovers). 
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